By: Zoran Avramović
Will a club that has proudly been owned by its supporters for more than a century become yet another example of the corporate – capitalist model of football?
A few days ago, President Florentino Pérez revealed Real Madrid’s plan for structural change and, for the first time in the club’s history, announced the introduction of external investors. The plan is for shareholders to collectively invest up to 5% of the club’s value, which is currently estimated at 6.5 billion dollars.
One organizational section of Real would cover the football operations, while the other would take on a commercial role, managing business activities, the ultra-modern stadium, TV rights, sponsorships, etc. This commercial sector would be offered to private investors. It resembles the Bavarian model: a subsidiary company, FC Bayern München AG, where “AG” stands for a joint-stock company. However, it’s important to note that in Germany – with the exception of Bayer Leverkusen and Wolfsburg – the “50+1 Rule” has been in place since 1999, giving fans the decisive vote.
Since its founding on March 6, 1902 (then as Madrid FC), Real has been owned by its socios, its members. Today, there are 98,272 of them, with two thousand representatives voting in the club assembly.
The episode of opening the door, even slightly, to external investors at the “court” of world football – the club that holds the record for Champions Cup and UEFA Champions League titles with 15 trophies – could be titled: “The Boomerang Flies, Flies…” Real has always won trophies without asking about the price. The Madrid giants were diligent setters of record transfer fees. They were the first to break the sound barrier in 2013 by bringing in Gareth Bale from Tottenham for €101 million. And how much was invested in the Galácticos 1 and 2 eras is almost impossible to calculate. In their imperial drive to conquer world football, nearly all the best and most expensive players were brought into orbit around the Bernabéu. It was sur–Real! The true interests of global football were completely ignored. The “royal” champagne was the starting gun of a financial race that tore the fabric of European football along its economic seam. The genie escaped from the bottle – in Madrid.
Why, then, is Real Madrid – even at the cost of changing the image of a club whose ownership model is built on the socios system – opening channels for shareholders and their money? Real’s management looks anxiously across the English Channel. After enormous TV-rights deals and, consequently, the influx of primarily American tycoons driven by profit, along with Arab investors often representing state-led projects aimed at reshaping the world’s perception of their countries, the English Premier League has become what Real Madrid once was through long periods: the absolute market leader. Now, the “king” has lost his monopoly and supremacy.
For Florentino Pérez, the socios model has become a weight the club must carry while competing against the overpaid English clubs. It is at the very least strange that no one has seriously worked on bringing transfer spending and player salaries to reasonable and sustainable levels. Doing so would also require a firm stance that fans are not merely spectators who buy tickets, scarves, flags, and pay for their passion – but active members who have a say in crucial questions of the club’s existence.
Variations always exist. There is no universal solution for such a living, dynamic sphere as football – shaped by history, tradition, and the socio-economic environment.
